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AUTOMATIC PROBATION’S 
REVIVAL AND THE RULE OF 
LENITY’S FALL IN CHINUHUK V. 
STATE 
Kate Goldberg* and Macklin Willigan** 
ABSTRACT 
Alaska’s common-law probation system requires that the period of supervision 
imposed is accompanied by a suspended term of imprisonment. Violation of 
probation conditions may trigger this suspended term, sending the probationer 
to prison. Should the probationer complete the entire suspended sentence, he or 
she is then usually eligible for discharge from probation. In Chinuhuk v. State, 
the Alaska Supreme Court held that the state legislature had abrogated this 
traditional scheme with respect to felony sex offenders, replacing it with one 
that allowed probation to continue although the offenders had completed their 
suspended terms of imprisonment. This Comment argues that in so doing, the 
court closed its eyes to any ambiguity in the operative statute, bypassing the 
rule of lenity’s lessons and enforcing a more punitive result than the legislature 
may have intended to create. 
I. INTRODUCTION
It is widely accepted that the United States suffers from a mass 
incarceration problem.1 One population within the criminal justice system 
that receives less attention than incarcerated individuals are those subject 
to alternative forms of punishment and supervision, including probation. 
This population is comprised of millions2 and must abide by probation’s 
myriad supervisory conditions3 that often regulate individuals’ behavior 
Copyright © 2021 by Kate Goldberg and Macklin Willigan. 
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Politics of Decarceration, Prisoners of Politics: Breaking the Cycle of Mass Incarceration
by Rachel Elise Barkow, Harvard University Press, 2019, 129 YALE L.J. 446, 451–52
(2020).
2.  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PROBATION AND PAROLE IN THE UNITED STATES, 2017-
2018 (Aug. 2020), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ppus1718_sum.pdf. 
3.  Fiona Doherty, Obey All Laws and Be Good: Probation and the Meaning of
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“far beyond what is covered by the criminal law.”4 With one in fifty-five 
adults in the United States and one in sixty-six adults in Alaska subject to 
probation or parole,5 the public ought to be assured that their respective 
legislatures are attentive to the public interests and consequences at stake. 
In Chinuhuk v. State,6 three sex offenders were sentenced under 
Alaska Statute section 12.55.125(o), a since-repealed provision that 
required the court to impose minimum suspended imprisonment and 
probationary periods depending on the given felony’s classification.7 
After repeated probation violations, all three offenders ultimately served 
their entire suspended sentences.8 Because their total sentences were 
imposed, they each requested to be discharged from probation.9 In each 
case, the superior court denied their motions to reject probation, holding 
that the length of probation was “specifically mandated by the legislature 
in AS 12.55.125(o).”10 
The offenders appealed, arguing that section 12.55.125(o)’s repeal 
restored their right to refuse probation.11 The court of appeals sided with 
the State on both issues, holding that the repeal was not retroactive and 
that the legislature had created mandatory probation that could not be 
refused.12 The offenders petitioned for a hearing in the Alaska Supreme 
Court.13 After conducting a textual analysis and examining the statute’s 
legislative history, the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the court of 
appeals on all grounds, holding that the trial court had no discretion to 
modify the terms of the petitioners’ probations and that the repeal of 
section 12.55.125(o) was not retroactive.14 
 
Recidivism, 104 GEO. L.J. 291, 292, 295 (2016) (noting relative lack of attention 
compared to mass incarceration and the “battery of conditions” courts may 
impose to regulate a probationer’s behavior). 
 4.  Id. at 295. 
 5.  Ronald Fraser, Alaska’s Parole Merry-Go-Round, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS 
(Feb. 2, 2020), https://www.adn.com/opinions/2020/02/02/alaskas-parole-
merry-go-round/ (citing a study by PEW Charitable Trusts titled “Probation and 
Parole Systems Marked by High Stakes, Missed Opportunities”). 
 6.  472 P.3d 511 (Alaska 2020). 
 7.  ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.125(o) (2006) (repealed 2016) (“The period of 
probation is in addition to any sentence received under (i) of this section and may 
not be suspended or reduced. Upon a defendant’s release from confinement in a 
correctional facility, the defendant is subject to this probation requirement and 
shall submit and comply with the terms and requirements of the probation.”); 
Chinuhuk, 472 P.3d at 513–14. 
 8.  Chinuhuk, 472 P.3d at 513–14. 
 9.  Id. 
 10.  Id. 
 11.  Id. at 514. 
 12.  Id. at 515. 
 13.  Id. 
 14.  Id. at 516–22. 
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Consequently, the majority enforced a unique, toothless 
probationary scheme that was unaccompanied by the conventional 
enforcement mechanism: suspended prison time. The Alaska Supreme 
Court departed from Alaska’s traditional understanding of probation to 
give force to an “inartfully drafted statute”15 and denied several 
individuals freedom from supervision following the completion of their 
remaining suspended time.16 In so doing, the court demonstrated a 
misdirected confidence in its statutory construction and a willingness to 
put the rule of lenity aside. The rule of lenity holds that “[a]mbiguities in 
criminal statutes must be narrowly read and construed strictly against the 
government.”17 It applies not only to provisions criminalizing activity but 
also to those imposing sentencing,18 and the Alaska courts have accepted 
it as a default rule of statutory construction.19 The court’s rejection of the 
rule of lenity in its interpretation of section 12.55.125(o) opened the door 
to more punitive results than the legislature may have intended, both in 
this case and those in the future. 
This Comment begins Part II with an overview of probation in 
Alaska and the statute under which the Chinuhuk petitioners were 
sentenced. Part III describes the facts of Chinuhuk and both the majority 
and the dissent’s reasoning. Part IV analyzes why, in the absence of a clear 
statement from the state legislature and in keeping with the rule of lenity, 
the court should have (1) construed section 12.55.125(o) against the 
government and (2) held that probation was only mandatory at the time 
of sentencing and did not survive fulfillment of the offenders’ suspended 
time. 
II. BACKGROUND 
In Alaska, probationers live under supervision and additional court-
imposed conditions for a prescribed period of time in exchange for 
suspended terms of imprisonment.20 Probation allows offenders to 
rebuild their lives in a community setting while under strict supervision.21 
During probation, a defendant must obey all court orders and may be 
required to comply with a number of conditions, including the paying of 
fines or restitution, participation in rehabilitative programs, and 
 
 15.  Id. at 525 (Carney, J., dissenting). 
 16.  Id. at 512–13. 
 17.  State v. Andrews, 707 P.2d 900, 907 (Alaska 1985). 
 18.  State v. Parker, 147 P.3d 690, 697 n.44 (Alaska 2006). 
 19.  Lee Perla, Mens Rea in Alaska: From Bad Thoughts to No Thoughts?, 23 
ALASKA L. REV. 139, 147 (2006). 
 20.  Chinuhuk v. State, 413 P.3d 1215, 1219 (Alaska Ct. App. 2018). 
 21.  Fraser, supra note 5. 
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compliance with sanctions imposed by the defendant’s probation 
officer.22 Traditionally imposed alongside probation, a suspended 
sentence is a delayed prison sentence that is enforced only if the 
defendant breaks the law or otherwise violates the terms of their 
probation.23 Alaska courts have long considered suspended terms a 
“necessary prerequisite” to common law probation.24 
Prior to Chinuhuk v. State, an Alaska court had only once upheld a 
probationary scheme unaccompanied by a suspended sentence. In State 
v. Auliye,25 the Alaska Court of Appeals reviewed a now-repealed law 
stating that any youth convicted of underage drinking must be placed on 
probation until they were twenty-one years old, regardless of whether a 
suspended sentence was imposed.26 Under Alaska common law, an 
individual may refuse probation and elect to serve active imprisonment 
instead.27 Yet, the court held in Auliye that the legislature may abrogate 
probation’s discretionary features, distinguishing this probationary 
scheme from “ordinary probation [because] neither the sentencing judge 
nor the defendant ha[d] any choice in the matter.”28 
In 2006, the Alaska Legislature created another mandatory 
probationary scheme. It enacted subsection (o) to ensure that felony sex 
offenders underwent a period of probationary supervision and submitted 
to periodic polygraph examinations.29 This subsection required courts to 
impose minimum suspended imprisonment and probationary periods 
depending on the felony’s classification.30 It stated that “[t]he period of 
probation is in addition to any sentence received under (i) of this section 
and may not be suspended or reduced.”31 Prior to its repeal in 2016, this 
subsection gave rise to the sentencing issues in Chinuhuk v. State.32 
 
 22.  ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.100 (2020). 
 23.  What is a Suspended Sentence?, ATTORNEYS.COM, 
https://www.attorneys.com/parole-and-probation/suspended-sentence (last 
visited Mar. 26, 2021). 
 24.  Chinuhuk v. State, 472 P.3d 511, 515 (Alaska 2020); see also Kelly v. State, 
842 P.2d 612, 613 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992) (“When a court sentences a defendant to 
serve a probationary period, the court must suspend a period of the sentence or 
else the probationary term is meaningless.”). 
 25.  57 P.3d 711 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002). 
 26.  ALASKA STAT. § 04.16.050 (2001) (repealed 2016); Auliye, 57 P.3d at 718. 
 27.  Chinuhuk, 413 P.3d at 1216. 
 28.  Auliye, 57 P.3d at 712. 
 29.  Chinuhuk, 413 P.3d at 1216, 1219 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.125(o) (2006) 
(repealed 2016)). 
 30.  ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.125(o). 
 31.  Id. 
 32.  Chinuhuk, 413 P.3d at 1217 (citing § 179, 2016 ALASKA SESS. LAWS ch. 36). 
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III. CASE DESCRIPTION 
In Chinuhuk, the Alaska Supreme Court reviewed a consolidated 
petition from three sex offenders: Edward Chinuhuk, Herman Malutin, 
and Christopher Wasili.33 Each was sentenced pursuant to former Alaska 
Statute section 12.55.125(o).34 Chinuhuk and Malutin had received 
convictions for attempted sexual abuse of a minor in the second degree 
and were each sentenced to five years of imprisonment, with three years 
suspended, and placed on probation for five years.35 Wasili was convicted 
of sexual assault in the second degree and sentenced to seven years of 
imprisonment, with two years suspended and five years of probation.36 
All three petitioners violated their probations repeatedly, resulting in the 
enforcement of their maximum suspended sentences.37 Upon completion 
of their suspended imprisonments, they each moved to be discharged 
from probation.38 The superior courts denied each offender’s motion and 
ordered them to continue probation upon release.39 
All three petitioners appealed these denials, and the Alaska Court of 
Appeals consolidated their cases.40 While the appeal was pending, the 
legislature repealed the provision under which they had been sentenced: 
subsection (o).41 The petitioners subsequently moved to have their appeal 
declared moot.42 
The Alaska Court of Appeals rejected the petitioners’ argument, 
relying primarily on the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in Warden 
v. Marrero.43 The court also sided with the State on the merits, holding that 
the legislature has the power to create mandatory, stand-alone probation 
and that the legislative history of section 12.55.125(o) suggested that the 
legislature intended to do just that.44 Finally, the petitioners appealed to 
the Alaska Supreme Court.45 
 
 33.  Chinuhuk v. State, 472 P.3d 511, 513 n.1 (Alaska 2020). 
 34.  Id. at 513 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.125(o) (2006) (repealed 2016)). 
Substantially similar to the repealed subsection, Alaska Statute section 
12.55.125(q) was enacted in 2017. ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.125(q) (2017). 
 35.  Chinuhuk, 472 P.3d at 513. 
 36.  Id. at 514. 
 37.  Id. at 513–14. 
 38.  Id. 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  Id. at 514. 
 41.  Id. 
 42.  Id. 
 43.  Id. (citing 417 U.S. 653 (1974) (considering an analogous claim involving 
amendments to sentencing laws and rejecting the defendant’s argument that he 
should benefit from a change that would allow drug offenders to apply for 
parole)). 
 44.  Id. at 515. 
 45.  Id. 
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A. Majority Opinion 
After conducting a textual analysis and examining subsection (o)’s 
legislative history, the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the court of 
appeals on all grounds, holding that the trial court had no discretion to 
modify the terms of the petitioners’ probations, and that the repeal of 
section 12.55.125(o) was not retroactive.46 
The majority began with a textual analysis of the penultimate 
sentence of former section 12.55.125(o): “The period of probation is in 
addition to any sentence received under (i) of this section and may not be 
suspended or reduced.”47 It concluded that both the words “suspended” 
and “reduced” referred to the “period of probation.”48 It explained that 
the sentence’s grammatical structure and natural reading supported this 
conclusion, but expressed concern because a court does not typically 
“suspend probation.”49 This reading of “suspended” therefore “d[id] not 
comport with common usage.”50 The majority reconciled this, however, 
by considering “the provision’s placement within the section of the 
criminal procedure code dealing with sentencing.”51 It concluded that the 
legislature must have “considered imprisonment and probation together 
to constitute a sex offender’s initial sentence,” no part of which could be 
suspended, reduced, or otherwise altered at the trial court’s discretion.52 
The majority concluded that by reading the statute in this way, no words 
were superfluous and the period of probation was necessarily 
mandatory.53 
The majority then used the legislative history of section 12.55.125(o) 
to bolster its conclusion that, regardless of suspension, the statute 
required mandatory probation. It discussed the legislature’s concern with 
sex offenders’ recidivism and the importance of probation as a tool to 
subject such offenders to mandatory polygraph tests.54 
Finally, the court held that the repeal of section 12.55.125(o) was not 
retroactive due to Alaska’s general saving statute, which “prevents 
elimination of penalties or rights under repealed statutes when those 
 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  Id. at 517 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.125(o) (2006) (repealed 2016)). 
 48.  Id. 
 49.  Id. 
 50.  Id. 
 51.  Id. 
 52.  Id. at 517–18. The majority noted that trial courts usually retain discretion 
to set the terms of probation under Alaska Statute section 12.55.080. Id. at 518. 
Section 12.55.125(o), the majority reasoned, was intended to foreclose such 
discretionary sentencing. Id. 
 53.  Id. at 518. 
 54.  Id. 
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penalties attached or rights vested previously.”55 The court reasoned that 
because the petitioners were placed on probation as part of the initial 
“penalty” incurred under subsection (o), the penalty had “attached” for 
purposes of the saving statute and therefore could not be “extinguished” 
by the repeal.56 The court affirmed the court of appeals on all grounds, 
holding that the petitioners had to serve their remaining probationary 
periods.57 
B. Justice Carney’s Dissent 
The lone dissenter in Chinuhuk, Justice Carney, reexamined the 
legislative history of section 12.55.125(o) and determined that the 
legislature did not clearly manifest an intent to create a new version of 
probation. Justice Carney, therefore, would have granted the petitioners’ 
requests to be released from supervision. 
First, Justice Carney identified the legislation’s apparent purpose: to 
address “the recidivism problem caused by sex offenders choosing to 
serve prison time without probation following their release.”58 She then 
traced this purpose through the subsection’s complicated history. First, 
the legislature increased the mandatory sentences of each felony.59 Then, 
following hearings, it amended the bill to require mandatory probation, 
but did not yet include suspended time.60 Finally, the legislature added 
mandatory suspension because “probation only has teeth if there’s 
suspended time so that if someone violates probation there’s an ability to 
punish them.”61 Justice Carney concluded that the amendment was 
created to ensure that sentencing courts did not have discretion in 
sentencing sex offenders.62 
  
 
 55.  Id. at 520. (citing ALASKA STAT. § 01.10.100(a) (2020) (“The repeal or 
amendment of a law does not release or extinguish any penalty, forfeiture, or 
liability incurred . . . unless the repealing or amending act so provides 
expressly.”)). 
 56.  Id. The court’s opinion was bolstered by the United States Supreme 
Court’s decision in Warden v. Marrero, in which the Supreme Court relied on an 
analogous saving statute to uphold a sentence after post-sentencing revisions to a 
federal sentencing statute. Id. (citing Warden v. Marrero, 417 U.S. 653, 660–64 
(1974)). 
 57.  Id. at 522. 
 58.  Id. at 523 (Carney, J., dissenting). 
 59.  Id. 
 60.  Id. 
 61.  Id. (quoting Hearing on S.B. 218 Before H. Fin. Comm., 24th Leg., 2d Sess. 
(Mar. 7, 2006) (statement of Deputy Att’y Gen. Susan Parkes at 1:50:52–1:51:07) 
(internal quotation omitted)). 
 62.  Id. at 524. 
38.1 GOLDBERG-WILLIGAN (DO NOT DELETE) 5/11/2021  10:39 PM 
164 ALASKA LAW REVIEW 38:1 
Justice Carney then discussed the necessity of having a suspended 
sentence run concurrently with probation. She noted that “[t]he court 
recognize[d] that probation requires suspended time in order to serve as 
the double-edged incentive and deterrent it was intended to be.”63 These 
effects were felt by each of the petitioners, as they all ultimately served 
their entire suspended prison sentences after violating probation.64 Justice 
Carney explained that it would offend long established precedent to add 
additional probation to the petitioners’ sentences.65 
Finally, Justice Carney distinguished this case from State v. Auliye.66 
While the court in Auliye found that “the legislature appeared to have 
purposefully crafted the unique probationary scheme imposed on the 
juvenile offender,” the ambiguous legislative history of the “inartfully 
drafted” section 12.55.125(o), “lacks any such intentional progress toward 
a probationary scheme for sexual offenders resulting in ‘meaningless 
probation.’”67 Thus, Justice Carney would have granted the petitioners’ 
requests for release from probation.68 
IV. ANALYSIS 
To begin, the Alaska Legislature was silent on the key question at 
issue in Chinuhuk: whether Alaska Statute section 12.55.125(o) was 
intended to supplant the common law understanding and prevailing 
operation of probation in Alaska.69 Typically, the imposition of 
suspended time goes hand-in-hand with probation, and one may not be 
imposed without the other.70 Section 12.55.125(o) seemed to tread the line 
between this traditional system and a novel one, requiring both the 
imposition of suspended time and probation at initial sentencing, while 
also stating that the probationary period is “in addition to any sentence 
received” under the primary sentencing provision and “may not be 
suspended or reduced.”71 In the absence of a clear statement rendering 
the statute unambiguous on this point, the Alaska Supreme Court should 
 
 63.  Id. 
 64.  Id. 
 65.  Id. 
 66.  Id. at 525 (citing State v. Auliye, 57 P.3d 711 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002)). 
 67.  Id. 
 68.  Id. 
 69.  Id. at 516 (“The core disagreement between the parties concerns what 
happens when the probationer has served the entirety of the suspended term but 
has not been on probation for the required amount of time.”). 
 70.  Kelly v. State, 842 P.2d 612, 613 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992) (“When a court 
sentences a defendant to serve a probationary period, the court must suspend a 
portion of the sentence or else the probationary term is meaningless.”) (emphasis 
added). 
 71.  ALASKA STAT. § 04.16.050 (2001) (repealed 2016). 
38.1 GOLDBERG-WILLIGAN (DO NOT DELETE) 5/11/2021  10:39 PM 
2021 MEANINGLESS OR MANDATORY? 165 
have, in accordance with the rule of lenity, construed the statute strictly 
and against the State.72 Despite the statute’s silence, the Chinuhuk majority 
remained satisfied, without expressly saying so, that section 12.55.125(o) 
was unambiguous once it parsed the law’s text and legislative history.73 
A. The Majority Relied on Legislative History to Provide What 
Section 12.55.125(o)’s Text Could Not 
The Chinuhuk majority began its textual analysis by conceding that a 
plain reading of subsection (o) “does not comport with common usage” 
but nevertheless reconciled this reading with the provision’s placement 
within the broader felony sentencing statute.74 The majority reasoned that 
because a sex offender’s initial sentence would consist of both mandatory 
imprisonment and mandatory probation, neither may be “suspended 
[n]or reduced.”75 The court took that as adequate—when viewed 
alongside muddled legislative history—to mean that the mandatory 
probation survived the completion of all initial and suspended 
imprisonment.76 Indeed, the court stopped short of finding that the plain 
text required anything more than removing a lower court’s discretion to 
“alter the terms of the mandatory probation . . . during initial 
sentencing”77—i.e., when the probation would have carried a mandatory 
suspended sentence.78 The majority therefore relied on section 
12.55.125(o)’s legislative history to bridge the gap and bypass any 
ambiguity. 
However, the legislative history on which the majority relied is far 
from dispositive regarding the statute’s clarity. First, two of the most 
convincing statements for the majority’s interpretation of the statute 
derived from hearings that predate the inclusion of subsection (o)’s 
 
 72.  See State v. Andrews, 707 P.2d 900, 907 (Alaska 1985) (“If a statute 
establishing a penalty is susceptible of more than one meaning, it should be 
construed so as to provide the most lenient penalty.”); see also Municipality of 
Anchorage v. Brooks, 397 P.3d 346, 349 (Alaska Ct. App. 2017) (explaining that the 
rule of lenity “comes into play only when, after employing normal methods of 
statutory construction, the legislature’s intent cannot be ascertained or remains 
ambiguous” (quoting De Nardo v. State, 819 P.2d 903, 907 (Alaska Ct. App. 
1991))). 
 73.  Chinuhuk, 472 P.3d at 517–19. 
 74.  Id. at 517–18. 
 75.  Id. 
 76.  Id. at 519. 
 77.  Id. at 518 (emphasis added). 
 78.  See ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.125(o) (2006) (repealed 2016) (requiring, in 
addition to the imposition of mandatory probation, the imposition of a mandatory 
suspended sentence). 
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mandatory suspended sentences.79 While this, standing alone, does not 
serve as proof that the legislature intended subsection (o)’s probation to 
be “identical to probation imposed under section .080,”80 it certainly 
dilutes the court’s reasoning that the statute, as enacted, is unambiguous. 
Second, the court relied on then-Deputy Attorney General Susan Parkes’ 
statement to the House Finance Committee to explain this later addition. 
By its own terms, however, the statement leaves open the possibility that 
the legislature did not intend the probationary period to outlast offenders’ 
suspended time: “[P]robation only has teeth if there’s suspended time 
required so that if someone violates probation there’s an ability to punish 
them. And so, section eight now mandates that there be suspended 
time . . . .”81 That the legislature would have intended only a fraction of 
the probation imposed to have “teeth” is inconsistent with the 
legislature’s supposed effort to combat recidivism.82 
B. The Majority’s Interpretation of Section 12.55.125(o) Lacks 
Support in Alaska’s Tradition of Common Law Probation 
The majority attempted to buttress its holding with a reference to 
State v. Auliye,83 but that case is distinguishable in significant ways. There, 
Alaska Statute section 04.16.05084 would not have necessarily carried an 
associated suspended sentence, or any prison time at all.85 Because the 
statute dealt with minors’ lower-level offenses, probation, and the 
conditions it imposed, was likely the only form of punishment those 
minors would receive. Thus, it was reasonable to read the legislature’s 
command that “[t]he person may not refuse probation”86 as establishing 
an automatic, mandatory probationary scheme that would supplant the 
 
 79.  Chinuhuk, 472 P.3d at 518. Senator Gretchen Guess emphasized the 
significance of post-release supervision and mandatory polygraph tests as public 
protection measures. Id. (citing Hearing on S.B. 218 Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 
24th Leg., 2d Sess. (Jan. 19, 2006) (statement of Sen. Gretchen Guess at 9:58:45–
9:59:15)). Senator Con Bunde focused on the deterrent effect of mandatory 
probation and polygraph testing. Id. (citing Hearing on H.B. 353 Before the H. 
Judiciary Comm., 24th Leg., 2d Sess. (Feb. 15, 2006) (statement of Sen. Con Bunde 
at 2:39:47–2:40:47)). 
 80.  Id. at 519. 
 81.  Id. (quoting Hearing on S.B. 218 Before H. Fin. Comm., 24th Leg., 2d Sess. 
(Mar. 7, 2006) (statement of Deputy Att’y Gen. Susan Parkes at 1:50:52–1:51:24)). 
 82.  Id. at 518. 
 83.  57 P.3d 711 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002). 
 84.  ALASKA STAT. § 04.16.050 (2001) (repealed 2016). 
 85.  See Auliye, 57 P.3d at 718 (“[T]he statute requires sentencing judges to 
place first offenders on probation even though, in most cases, there will be no 
suspended sentence to impose in the event that the defendant fails to honor the 
terms of probation . . . .”). 
 86.  ALASKA STAT. § 04.16.050 (2001) (repealed 2016). 
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usual operation of Alaska Statute 12.55.080.87 In stark contrast, a person 
convicted of a sexual offense pursuant to section 12.55.125(o)—on both 
the parties’ and the court’s reading—will always have a suspended 
sentence associated with his or her initial sentencing.88 Therefore, 
probation under section 12.55.125(o) is more analogous to Alaska’s 
common law probation, and the majority’s reliance on Auliye as a 
comparable recognition of a legislative abrogation of the traditional 
probation approach was misplaced. 
While it is not entirely correct that the probation at issue in Chinuhuk 
serves “[n]o purpose,”89 the purpose served—subjecting sex offenders to 
polygraph tests—is a shell of what probation is understood to mean in 
Alaska. The representatives to which the majority cited for support of its 
reading produced a statute that was silent on the crucial question, but 
ultimately included a hallmark of common law probation in the enacted 
bill: mandatory suspended imprisonment.90 The state legislature, having 
linked the imposition of mandatory probation with a mandatory 
suspended sentence, created a type of probation that, while automatic, 
reflected the traditional components of common law probation in Alaska. 
It ought to operate as such, unless and until the legislature makes a clear 
statement. 
C. The Rule of Lenity’s Application Would Have Avoided an 
Unwarranted Expansion of Probation and Its Consequences 
The rule of lenity’s principle of judicial restraint comes through the 
dissent’s reading of section 12.55.125(o), which would have honored the 
concrete aspects of the legislature’s intent.91 The legislature’s effort to 
increase the penalties and create a mandatory type of probation for sex 
offenders would have been respected, without extending the time 
convicted sex offenders must abide by “meaningless” probation 
conditions.92 On the dissent’s reading, the probation imposed by 
subsection (o) could not be reduced, so long as the probationary period 
 
 87.  ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.080 (2020). 
 88.  See Chinuhuk v. State, 472 P.3d 511, 516 (Alaska 2020) (quoting 
Appellants’ Brief at 9); id. (explaining that the State understood AS 12.55.125(o) to 
“require[] suspended imprisonment to provide an incentive to comply with the 
terms of probation”); id. at 519 (asserting that the legislature “[c]learly . . . 
contemplated imposition of portions of suspended imprisonment for probation 
violations”). 
 89.  Id. at 525 (Carney, J., dissenting). 
 90.  Young v. Embley, 143 P.3d 936, 945 (Alaska 2006) (“We presume that the 
legislature is aware of the common law when enacting statutes.”). 
 91.  Chinuhuk, 472 P.3d at 523 (Carney, J., dissenting). 
 92.  Id. at 522–23 (Carney, J., dissenting). 
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was in effect—i.e., so long as it was linked to a period of suspended time. 
Were this the outcome, the legislature would have had a chance to make 
a clearer statement. Now, however, the legislature may content itself with 
an unintended, severe though satisfactory, reading of the statute, 
absolving it of responsibility for the outcomes it produces. 
It is difficult to outline those outcomes sufficiently due to probation’s 
inherent flexibility and breadth, but they are many.93 Probation’s terms 
may impose fines and restrictions that go beyond the statutory maximum 
for those same penalties had they been imposed on a direct sentence 
rather than through probation.94 So long as the terms reasonably relate to 
a sentencing court’s perspective on the probationer’s rehabilitation and 
the public’s protection, the court may impose “special conditions” that 
limit an individual’s liberty beyond the norm.95 Courts aside, probation 
officers occasionally have the discretion to impose additional 
requirements on those they supervise.96 
Whether a court or probation officer imposes conditions that are 
particularly onerous or run-of-the-mill, their imposition is rife with policy 
judgments related to rehabilitation, public safety, and individual liberty. 
In cases where, as in Chinuhuk, the question is whether the legislature has 
provided for the imposition of probation’s restrictions and obligations 
beyond what the common law provides, courts should go no further than 
the statute’s text allows. Here, the rule of lenity’s application would have 
preserved the legislature’s clear intent to impose probation as a 
mandatory feature of a sex offender’s sentence but would not have 
required that this probation outlast its associated suspended sentence, a 
cornerstone of common law probation. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Chinuhuk petitioners presented the Alaska Supreme Court with 
two key issues: (1) whether the trial court had discretion to discharge the 
petitioners from probation once they had exhausted their suspended time 
 
 93.  See Roman v. State, 570 P.2d 1235, 1240 (Alaska 1977) (noting that a court 
has broad authority to tailor a probation term’s conditions to the case before it). 
 94.  See Baum v. State, 24 P.3d 577, 582 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001) (“Probation 
conditions often restrict a defendant’s activities beyond the limits of what a 
sentencing court might impose as a direct component of the defendant’s 
sentence.”). 
 95.  Thomas v. State, 710 P.2d 1017, 1019 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985) (affirming the 
courts’ power to impose such conditions, while finding the condition at issue too 
restrictive of the petitioner’s liberty to be permissible). 
 96.  ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.100(a)(2)(E), (H) (2020) (defining a probation 
officer’s authority (1) to require participation in rehabilitation programs and (2) 
impose sanctions for violations of probation conditions); Diorec v. State, 295 P.3d 
409, 414–15 (Alaska Ct. App. 2013). 
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and (2) whether the repeal of section 12.55.125(o) restored the petitioners’ 
right to refuse probation.97 The majority answered each in the negative, 
and the former based on a strained reading of the statute’s text and 
legislative history.98 Because the legislature did not clearly indicate its 
intent to override Alaska’s traditional probation, Justice Carney found the 
statute ambiguous and dissented.99 Between two possible constructions—
one sweeping, the other narrow—the court committed to the former. 
The imposition of probation and its attendant conditions is no 
insignificant act. Given the state of Alaska’s probation and parole 
systems,100 an expansion of those serving probationary terms ought to 
derive from a clear legislative statement. There may be compelling 
reasons to subject a certain class of sex offenders to ongoing surveillance 
and polygraphs without the threat of future imprisonment. However, 
until the legislature as a whole, rather than select individuals with a stake 
in the legislative process, expressly says so in a statute, courts should heed 
the rule of lenity and refrain from interpreting ambiguous criminal 
statutes to increase their punitive reach. Because of the profound impact 
probation’s supervisory conditions have on probationers’ lives, and the 
sheer number of people subject to such conditions in Alaska, the 
extension of probation and its attendant conditions should come from 
carefully considered legislative enactments, not the courts. 
 
 
 97.  Chinuhuk, 472 P.3d at 512–13. 
 98.  Id. at 516–20. 
 99.  Id. at 522–23 (Carney, J., dissenting). 
 100.  Fraser, supra note 5. 
